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THE SOVEREIGN COMPULSION DEFENSE IN
ANTITRUST ACTIONS AND THE ROLE OF
STATEMENTS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
Large numbers of export cartels' and increasing governmental involve-
ment in commerce present the potential for greater conflicts between
United States antitrust law and the decrees of foreign governments. Sov-
ereign compulsion as a defense to antitrust complaints is one method for
dealing with the contradictory obligations imposed on private parties
where such conflicts exist. Sovereign compulsion has been discussed by
courts and commentators many times in recent years, yet the limits of the
defense and the requirements for its application remain unclear.
To demonstrate a sovereign compulsion defense, defendants must show
that their actions, although possibly in violation of United States antitrust
law, were done in compliance with the directives of a foreign government
and, therefore, should not be subject to liability under United States law. A
special problem arises in this context when a foreign government submits a
statement on behalf of a party that is asserting a sovereign compulsion
defense. The response of United States courts to such statements has
ranged from deference to disregard.
Although a sovereign compulsion defense has been acknowledged by
several courts and actually applied by one,2 controversy remains over its
scope and the prerequisites for its application. The participation of foreign
governments adds significantly to the complexity of these cases. The policy
reasons for recognizing the sovereign compulsion defense lead to the
conclusion that a defense of sovereign compulsion should be based on de
facto compulsion, rather than de jure compulsion, but should not extend to
any action taken within the territory of the United States. Examination of
the role of foreign government statements in establishing a sovereign
compulsion defense compels finding that statements of sufficient clarity
and detail'merit conclusive weight in establishing the existence of sov-
ereign compulsion, but such statements should not be a basis for expanding
the limits of the defense.
1. OECD REPORT OF THE COMM=TTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BusINEsS PRACtCEs: ExPoRT
CARTELs 24-25, tables 1-2 (1974) [hereinafter ExPoRT CARTELS].
2. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Relationship Between United States Antitrust Jurisdiction and the
Policies of Foreign Governments
The United States bases antitrust jurisdiction on an "effects test," '3
rather than on the situs of the alleged unlawful activities.4 This allows
United States antitrust law to be applied to conduct that takes place outside
the United States, 5 raising the possibility of conflict with the laws and
policies of foreign governments. Use of United States domestic law to
regulate conduct abroad has evoked a considerable number of hostile
responses from foreign governments. 6 The potential for a hostile foreign
3. Thisjurisdictional test, expounded in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,444
(2d Cir. 1945), gives United States courts jurisdiction over conduct abroad that is intended to and does in
fact have effects within the United States.
4. The decision to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction is due in part to the realization that without
some ability to reach extraterritorial conduct, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to control the
commercial conduct of multinational corporations. Statement of Shenefield, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 12. 15-16 (J. Griffin ed. 1979)
(hereinafter PERSPECTIVES); accord OECD REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES: RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 35 (1977)
[hereinafter RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES]; The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles
and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, 35 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item
61(c)), U.N. Doc. A/C.2/35/6 (1980) (adopted by G.A. Res. 35/63, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.48)
U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981) [hereinafter U.N. Rules and Principles]. For these reasons, the United States
Department of Justice has adopted the position that such jurisdiction will continue tobe exercised. See
Statement of Shenefield, in PERSPECTIVES at 13; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6-7 (1977) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDE].
5. There is some controversy over this exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The exercise of
jurisdiction to compel conduct within another country (enforcement jurisdiction) may be seen as a
direct violation of that other nation's sovereignty, see, e.g., British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial
Chem. Indus., Ltd., 1953 Ch. 19 (CA 1952), 1955 Ch. 37 (1954), refusing to enforce decree of United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). and a violation of
international law, see, e.g., H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 209 (A. Wedberg trans.
1945). However, the imposition of sanctions for conduct that takes place outside the borders of a nation
is not a violation of international law. Id. Indeed, the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign acts that have
direct and foreseeable domestic effects has gained support, at least in principle, in fourteen countries
and from the European Communities. See RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 37.
6. These responses have ranged from diplomatic protests, see, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers
of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965
Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (order modified after strong diplomatic protest over scope of
court order), to the enactment of hostile legislation, see, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980,
ch. I I (British law blocking production of evidence, enforcement of foreign judgments, and creating a
statutory cause of action for those doing business in the United Kingdom to recover two-thirds of foreign
antitrust judgments where that judgment is not based exclusively on conduct occurring within the
territory of the country imposing judgment); Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, ch. 49 (Feb 14,
1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 794 (1985) (Canadian law empowering Canadian Attorney General to
issue blocking orders and to declare foreign judgments unenforceable). Id. § 3(l). The result of a
declaration of unenforceability is to permit suit to recover from the foreign plaintiff 100% of the amount
of the judgment to the extent that it has been declared unenforceable. Id. § 9(1). See generally I J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 100-05 (2d ed. supp. 1985).
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response increases significantly where sovereign compulsion is involved,
because the plaintiff is challenging conduct imposed by a foreign govern-
ment, for political, economic, or national security reasons. 7
The means adopted by a foreign government to regulate commercial
conduct may affect both American and foreign enterprises and may involve
the foreign country's domestic, import, or export markets. For example,
countries reliant on a single export commodity may require exporters,
regardless of nationality, to form a cartel to regulate prices and quantities of
exports. 8 In other circumstances, a government may order that its exports
not reach certain destinations or customers. 9 Without a sovereign compul-
sion defense, private parties that complied with these kinds of regulation
would be guilty of violating United States antitrust law. ' 0
B. Status of the Sovereign Compulsion Defense
Sovereign compulsion is a substantive defense," distinguishable from
jurisdictional defenses such as sovereign immunity. 12 Acknowledgment of
the defense has usually taken the form of dicta stating that if the defendant's
conduct had in fact been compelled by a foreign government, the court
would be powerless to impose liability.13 In describing what constitutes
7. Given the vehemence with which foreign governments have responded to antitrust investigations
that involved conduct in their territories, it is not difficult to imagine the potential damage to United
States foreign relations that could result from challenging conduct that was commanded by those
governments. See infra note 53.
8. This is essentially the situation presented in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 E2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). This
case might have had greater relevance to the sovereign compulsion doctrine had the OPEC organization
itself not been dismissed for improper service of process. Id. at 1356. That dismissal left only foreign
governments, for whom the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity were available, as defendants.
If OPEC itself had remained a party and the court had determined OPEC to be an entity separate from
the member governments, OPEC's defense may well have involved a claim of sovereign compulsion.
9. See, e.g., Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del.
1970).
10. See, e.g., Klors v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, reh'g denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940).
11. See, e.g., Timberg, Sovereign Immunity andAct of State Defenses: TransnationalBoycotts and
Economic Coercion, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1976).
12. Because a defense based on sovereign compulsion denies neither the challenged conduct nor its
effects, it cannot be a defense to United States jurisdiction. See supra note 3. This Comment will not
discuss other defenses, except in their relation to the sovereign compulsion defense.
13. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 723 F.2d 238, 315 (7thCir. 1983)
("We may assume, without deciding, that a government mandated export cartel would be outside the
ambit of section 1 of the Sherman Act."); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549
F.2d 597,606 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[C]orporate conduct which is compelled by a foreign sovereign is also
protected from antitrust liability .. "); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center,
Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600,77,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ("If, of course, the defendants' activities had
been required by Swiss law, this court could indeed do nothing."). But see Sabre Shipping Corp. v.
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"compulsion," most courts and commentators have suggested a strict
standard requiring foreign legislation directing the conduct. 14 On the other
hand, in Interanerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 15 the
only decision actually applying the defense, the court held that the oral
statement of an official of a Venezuelan regulatory agency constituted
sufficient compulsion to invoke the protection of the defense. 16
Such government regulatory action does not rise to the level of legis-
lative compulsion.
1. Proof of Sovereign Compulsion in Interamerican
The court in Interamnerican attached great significance to the statements
of officials of a foreign government's regulatory agency regarding restric-
tions imposed on exporters doing business in that country. The plaintiffs in
Interamerican were Venezuelans who had contracted to lease a bonded
refinery in New Jersey, hoping to process Venezuelan crude oil into fuel for
sale to ships leaving New York. Due to a change in the political climate in
Venezuela, the Venezuelan export authorities decided to terminate ship-
ments to plaintiffs and instructed all exporters of Venezuelan oil that no
further oil was to reach plaintiffs. 17 The exporters' discrimination in
refusing to sell to Interamerican constituted a prima facie antitrust viola-
tion. I8
In holding that the exporters were protected by a sovereign compulsion
defense, the district court relied on newspaper interviews with and tele-
phone instructions to exporters from the Venezuelan Coordinating Com-
mission for the Conservation of Commerce and Hydrocarbons as evidence
of compulsion. 19 The court's reliance on statements of policy by officials of
a foreign administrative agency as evidence of compulsion is very relevant
to the analogous situation where such a statement is made directly to a
United States court.
American President Lines, 285 F. Supp. 949,954(S. D.N.Y. 1968), cert denied. 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.),
cert denied sub nom. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 395 U.S. 922 (1969) (Foreign
government directive "would not necessarily immunize defendants from prosecution or civil responsi-
bility for acts done in United States commerce.").
14. See. e.g., Watchmakers of Switz., 1963 Trade Cas. at 77.456 ; Note, Development of the
Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MICH. L. REv. 888 (1971). But see Ttmberlane Lumber Co., 549
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
15. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
16. Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1295-96.
17. Id. at 1295.
18. Id. at 1294 & n.6.
19. Id. at 1295.
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2. Treatment by Other Courts of Foreign Government Statements as
Proof of Compulsion
Unfortunately, Interamerican stands as an anomaly. Despite precedents
for giving conclusive effect to statements by foreign sovereigns explaining
their law, policy, or actions, 20 where such statements have been submitted
in antitrust cases, the statements have generally been ignored, questioned,
and disparaged by the courts. 21
The most recent case raising a sovereign compulsion defense was the
Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation. 22 In that case, the defen-
dants, Japanese manufacturers of consumer electronic products, argued,
inter alia, that the antitrust complaints should be dismissed because their
minimum price agreements and "five-company rule"23 were adopted in
compliance with directives from the Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI).
In Zenith, MITI submitted a statement to the district court asserting
MITI's authority to regulate Japanese exports and stating that the minimum
price agreements and five-company rule were indeed mandated by MITI in
its role as a regulatory authority. The district court considered the state-
ments, but granted the defendants' summary judgment motion on other
grounds. 24 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, after reversing several
of the district court's evidentiary rulings, remanded the action. In so doing,
the court of appeals stated that on remand it would be possible for the finder of
fact to reach conclusions directly contrary to the assertions of MITI. 25
20. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); infra note 99 and accompanying text.
21. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 310 (3d Cir. 1983) (the trier of fact
could find that the minimum price agreement was not mandated by the Japanese government in direct
contradiction to the statement of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI));
United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. 70,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (no reference to the amicus curiae
brief of the Swiss Federation). Compare statement of Ministry of Int'l Trade and Industry at 3-4, Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 198 1) [hereinafter MITI
Statement]; In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[S]hockinglytous,
the governments of the defaulters have subserviently presented for them their case against the exercise of
jurisdiction."); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1465 n.31
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (declining to give a statement by the Honduran government any independent signifi-
cance because of its relatively mild content in comparison with other foreign government protests).
22. This litigation encompasses a dozen or more reported opinions, but this Comment will only deal
with three: Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981);In
re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1983); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
23. The "five-company rule" prohibited each Japanese manufacturer from selling its products to
more than five companies that would export the products to the United States. In reJapaneseElec. Prods.,
723 F.2d at 310. For each manufacturer, one of the five companies was its own United States subsidiary.
24. Zenith, 513F. Supp. 1100, 1180-1329 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (dismissingShermanActclaimsforlackof
admissible evidence of conspiracy).
25. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 310, 315.
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II. ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENSE
The sovereign compulsion defense has, with one exception, 26 been
recognized only in dicta. Therefore, it is difficult to define the substantive
elements of the defense. However, a doctrine is shaped by the policy
considerations that give it life. 27 By exploring policy considerations, it is
possible to formulate a rational and pragmatic definition for the sovereign
compulsion defense. These policy considerations dictate that the conduct
protected by a sovereign compulsion defense be limited to activities that (1)
take place within the jurisdiction of the compelling sovereign, (2) are
undertaken in compliance with the express policy of the foreign govern-
ment (de facto compulsion), and (3) are actively supervised by that govern-
ment.
A. Bases for a Sovereign Compulsion Defense
Five principal grounds have been advanced in support of a sovereign
compulsion defense: (1) analogy to state action immunity under Parker v.
Brown,28 (2) analogy to the act of state doctrine, (3) statutory construction
of the Sherman Act, 29 (4) international comity, and (5) fairness to the
defendant. A synthesis of these fundamental principles produces a rational,
workable definition for the defense.
1. State Action Immunity Under Parker
State30 action immunity, as established in Parker v. Brown3 1 and ex-
plained in subsequent cases, 32 provides support for a territorial limit on the
26. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
27. Compare Amicus Curiae Brief of the Government of the United States at 23-24, Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986) (arguing that the sovereign
compulsion defense is based on judiciary's desire not to interfere with executive's conduct of foreign
policy, and, therefore, that the defense should not be available where the United States government has
brought suit because such considerations are resolved by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion) with
Meal, Government Compulsion as a Defense Under United States and European Community Antitrust
Law, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51. 57 (1981) (Inquiry, regardless of plaintiff, should be to identify
"bona fide government compulsion" because defense is based on "sympathy fora helpless private party"
that is lacking where the defendant was not truly compelled.).
28. 317 U.S. 341(1943).
29. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1985).
30. It should be noted that the word "state" in the term "state action immunity" refers to states of the
United States of America. This is in contrast to the use of the same word to indicate a nation in the context
of international law. Thus the "state" referred to in "act of state doctrine" is a sovereign nation. In the
interest of clarity this Comment will use the word "state" only to refer to states of the United States except
in the phrase "act of state doctrine."
31. 317U.S.341(1943).
32. See infra notes 42-46.
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sovereign compulsion defense and for a de facto standard for determining
compulsion. In Parker, the Supreme Court held that raisin producers were
not liable under the Sherman Act for conduct required under California law,
even though the conduct would have been a violation of the Sherman Act.33
The Supreme Court reasoned that there was no evidence in the legislative
history of the Sherman Act to indicate congressional intent to restrain state
action. 34 The Court also employed a presumption against nullifying a
state's control over its officers and agents in the absence of express congres-
sional intent.35
a. Analogy to a Sovereign Compulsion Defense with Territorial Limits
Commentators have pointed out that the analogy between the compul-
sion of state government directives and that of foreign government direc-
tives is highly persuasive. 36 This analogy has been criticized, however,
because the Parker doctrine is based on the unique relation between federal
and state governments in the United States. 37 This criticism misinterprets
the rationale of the decision in Parker and ignores the strong analogy
between the problem of conflicting sovereignty in questions of federalism
and the problem of conflicting sovereignty in questions of extraterritorial
application of domestic law.38
The fundamental principle of the Parker decision lies not in its reference
to federalism; instead Parker's fundamental principle is found in its holding
that the purpose of the Sherman Act is to suppress combinations in restraint
of trade formed by "individuals and corporations," not restraints on trade
imposed by governments. 39 Although the Court's reference in Parker was
33. Parker, 317 U.S. at350.
34. Id. at 351 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 2562,2457,2459,2461 (1890)) & n.7.
35. Id. at 351.
36. 16 VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 5.03[3], at5-39 (1986);Waller, RedefiningtheForeign CompulsionDefense in U.S.AntitrustLaw:The
Japanese Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747 (1982); Comment, Foreign
Sovereign Compulsion and theArab Boycott:A State Action Analogy, 65 GEo. L.J. 1001 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Note, supra note 14, at 896 & n.47; Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion asa
Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 129-30 (1967).
38. In questions of federalism, there is a conflict between the sovereignty of the state and the
sovereignty of the federal government. In the international context, the conflict is between the sovereignty
of the United States and the sovereignty of a foreign nation. A major difference between the two situations
is the presence in the domestic setting of the United States Constitution, which establishes the supremacy
of the federal government in direct conflicts between the two sovereigns. In the international context, the
same function should be served by the fundamental principles of sovereign equality (see U.N. CHARTER
PREAMBLE) and territorial supremacy (see, RESTATEMENT (REvISED) FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNrrED STATES TENTATIVE DRAFT No.6 (April 12, 1985) § 436; H. KELSEN, supra, note 5 at 212; accord
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970)).
39. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
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specifically to state governments, it is irrational to infer that Congress
intended to place greater restrictions on efforts by foreign governments to
regulate trade than on efforts by subordinate states to regulate trade. 40 On
the other hand, it would be equally irrational to infer that Congress
intended to relinquish its own sovereign authority over commercial activity
within the territory of the United States. Therefore, the proper conclusion
to be drawn from the Parker court's interpretation of the Sherman Act is
that the Act is not intended to apply when action is directed by a govern-
ment and carried out within the territorial boundaries of that government's
sovereignty.
The corollary to this conclusion is that the United States government
intends that the Sherman Act be applied to actions directed by governments
when those actions impinge on the sovereignty of the United States.
Consequently, a sovereign compulsion defense, insofar as it is based on this
interpretation of the Sherman Act, would logically be limited to actions
that take place within the territory of the foreign government.
b. Standards for the Degree and Proof of Foreign Compulsion
Analogy to state action immunity also supports the use of de facto
compulsion and active government supervision as standards for applying a
sovereign compulsion defense. In Parker, the trade restraint was required
by a state legislative act. 41 However, recent cases have held that there need
not be direct statutory compulsion (per se compulsion), so long as the
challenged restraint of trade is in accordance with "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed . . . state policy" and is "actively supervised by
the state." 42 In the most recent of these cases, Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 43 the Court held it improper to
require per se compulsion before granting antitrust immunity, because to
do so would deny states the flexibility necessary for the formation of
regulatory programs. 44 By analogy, a per se compulsion requirement in a
foreign government compulsion context should also be rejected. 45
40. The conclusion drawn by one student commentator, see Note, supra note 14, at 896 n.47. that
Congress did not intend to give foreign governments the discretion to "develop their own policies free
from federal interference," either expresses a misconception of the bounds of what Congress is able to
give, or is a poorly worded attempt to describe a limit on foreign government involvement in the
development of United States policies.
41. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346.
42. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1977); California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980): Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 1729 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985).
44. Southern Motor Carriers, 105 S. Ct. at 1729.
45. The Court's reasoning is applicable to the sovereign compulsion defense because of the analogy
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The state action immunity analogy also supports giving conclusive
weight to government statements. In Southern Motor Carriers, the Su-
preme Court cited an amicus brief of the state of Mississippi to support its
conclusion that the encouragement of collective ratemaking was an active
exercise of the regulatory agency's discretion. 46 In a sovereign compulsion
context, government statements merit conclusive weight in determining
whether the exercise of delegated authority was in keeping with the policies
of the delegating government, because no more authoritative voice can
speak on the subject. 47
2. Analogy to the Act of State Doctrine
Some courts have discissed the act of state doctrine and sovereign
compulsion so closely as to imply a lack of distinction between the two.48
Although they are distinct,49 the two doctrines have similar foundations,
and, therefore, an understanding of the act of state doctrine is important to
an understanding of the limits of the validity of foreign decrees.
between the resolution of conflicts in sovereignty between states and the federal government and the
resolution of conflicts in sovereignty between the United States and other nations. See supra note 38.
Assuming one accepts the analogy, one can see the argument against a per se compulsion requirement by
substituting in the Court's language in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc v. United States,
105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985), the words "sovereign compulsion," "national sovereignty," and "foreign
government" for their analogical counterparts in the domestic context-"Parker," "federalism," and
"State," respectively:
The [sovereign compulsion] doctrine represents an attempt to resolve conflicts that may arise
between principles of [national sovereignty] and the goal of the antitrust laws, unfettered competi-
tion in the marketplace. A compulsion requirement is inconsistent with both values. It reduces the
range of regulatory alternatives available to the [foreign government]. At the same time, insofaras it
encourages [foreign governments] to require, rather than merely permit, anticompetitive conduct, a
compulsion requirement may result in greater restraints on trade. We do not believe that Congress
intended to resolve conflicts between two competing interests by impairing both more than neces-
sary.
Id. at 1729 (context altered).
46. Southern Motor Carriers, 105 S. Ct. at 1730.
47. This question arose in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962). In that case, a Canadian company used its position as exclusive buying agent for the Canadian
government to give its United States parent company a monopoly on sales in Canada. Id. at 695. The Court
refused to allow a sovereign compulsion defense, in part because there was no evidence that the Canadian
government approved of or had directed that practice. Id. at 706. In this situation, a statement by the
delegating government that its agent's exercise of authority was in accord with its national policy should
bring that exercise of authority within the protection of the sovereign compulsion defense.
48. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir.
1977); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (D. Conn. 1977).
49. See Timberg, supra note II, at 21-22; Waller, supra note 36, at 789-92. Both argue that
simultaneous discussion of act of state and sovereign compulsion creates unhelpful confusion as to the
proper function of each.
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The classic statement of the act of state doctrine is found in dictum in
Underhill v. Hernandez.50 The Supreme Court in Underhill stated that
United States courts will not judge the acts of foreign governments done
within their own territory. 51 Although the doctrine was originally based on
considerations of sovereignty 52 and international comity, 53 the Supreme
Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino54 stated that the doctrine
was in fact based on the primary responsibility of the executive, rather than
the judicial, branch for United States foreign policy. 55 Nonetheless, the
principle that United States courts will not inquire into the validity of
territorial acts of foreign governments survived the shift in bases for the
doctrine. 56 Therefore, under the act of state doctrine, inquiry into the
validity of a foreign government directive is barred where the foreign
government affirms or presents other evidence to show that the foreign
government acted to direct conduct within its territory. Logically, the same
reasoning must apply whether questioning the foreign government or
attacking those who follow the directive.
3. Statutory Construction of the Sherman Act
Two different approaches to statutory interpretation of the Sherman Act
support the sovereign compulsion defense. First, the Supreme Court has
50. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
51. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
52. Id. at 258.
53. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) (failure to accept the acts of foreign
states would "certainly imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of
nations").
54. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
55. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. The United States Government has argued that this division of
foreign policy responsibility is the basis for the act of state doctrine and, therefore, is also grounds for
denying the sovereign compulsion defense in actions brought by the United States. Brief of United States
as Amicus Curiae at 23, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348. The
Solicitor General and the Department ofJustice argued that the exercise ofprosecutorial discretion by the
Department of Justice amounts to a resolution of the foreign policy questions involved. Consequently,
there would no longer be a need for the courts to deferto the executive and no purpose would be served by
allowing a sovereign compulsion defense. Id. However, this argument fails to take into account any of the
other considerations underlying the sovereign compulsion defense such as international comity. More-
over, such a position would permit the executive branch to arrogate the power to make a conclusive
determination of law (the conclusion that a valid defense applies in a given factual setting) and would
subject potential defendants to the vagaries of the United States administration's foreign policy. See
discussion of fairness to defendant, infra Part II.A.5.
56. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398. This decision was followed in Interamerican Refining Corp v.
Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1299 (D. Del. 1970). See also Timberlane Lumber Co., v.
Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 E2d 597 615 n.34 (9th Cir. 1977) (questioning the validity of foreign law
or policy is a task which the act of state doctrine prohibits courts from undertaking). But see ANTrTRUsT
GUtDE, supra note 4, at 54 ("The act upon which the defense is based must be the act of a truly sovereign
entity acting within the scope of its powers under the law of its nationality."). This statement was
repudiated by one of its authors. See Statement of D. Rosenthal, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 91.
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determined that the Sherman Act was not intended to apply to restraints
imposed by governments. 57 The second statutory approach is a pragmatic
interpretation of "commerce" as it is used in the Sherman Act.58 Where a
restriction is an essential prerequisite for doing business, compliance with
that restriction cannot be a restraint of trade because there would be no
trade without the restriction. 59 In other words, if a party is punished for
complying with such a restriction, enterprises would have to choose one or
the other country in which to do business; the result would be the elimina-
tion rather than the promotion of United States commerce. 60 This would
defeat the goals of the Sherman Act.61
This statutory approach supports, as a condition for granting a sovereign
compulsion defense, a requirement that the challenged conduct be com-
pelled by a foreign government as part of its national policy. However, this
interpretation does not support going so far as to require a statutory basis
for the compulsion. A foreign sovereign might well insist on noncom-
petitive conduct without a specific statutory enactment. 62 Yet that sovereign
retains the power to punish or exclude from its commerce those who do not
comply with its policies. Therefore, the risk of being forced to choose
between one or another country in which to do business is equally present
where foreign national policies are not expressed in legislation.
4. International Comity
International comity supports the use of a priori rules and a territorial
limitation to the sovereign compulsion defense. International comity also
provides an additional basis for accepting statements of foreign sovereigns
on the nature, intent, and effects of their domestic actions. International
comity has been defined as "[t]hat body of rules which states observe
57. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). This is the basis for the state action immunity
doctrine. See discussion of this interpretation and state action immunity, supra Part lI.A. 1.
58. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1985).
59. Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1298 (quoting K. BREWSTER, ANrrrRUST AND AMERICAN Bust-
NESS ABROAD 94 (Ist ed. 1958)).
60. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement for Proposed Consent Judgment in United States v.
Bechtel Corp., 42 Fed. Reg. 3716, 3723 (1977), decree entered, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,429
(N.D. Cal. 1979) [hereinafter Competitive Impact Statement] (entering judgment without allowing for
compliance with foreign regulations in those countries "would have jeopardized the continued conduct of
any business by the defendants (and possibly others) in Arab Countries").
61. See Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1298; J. ATWOOD& K. BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 266-67.
62. An example of such a situation could be a nation, heavily dependent on exports, that creates an
agency and authorizes that agency to regulate exports without giving specific statutory instructions as to
how that authority is to be exercised. In such a situation, there would be no express statutory authority for
any given anticompetitive restriction on exports (there might even be inconsistent domestic regulations),
and as a result, one could argue that there is no "legal" basis for compliance with the restriction.
Nonetheless, that government may view the restriction as being vital to its national interests.
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towards one another from courtesy or mutual convenience, although they
do not form part of international law." 63 International comity is said to
require the consideration or "balancing" 64 of the interests of the nations
involved.65
A recent example of the application of this kind of policy-balancing
approach can be found in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,66
which involved an act of state defense. In Timberlane, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit offered a three point test:
Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign
commerce of the United States? Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be
recognized as a violation of the Sherman Act? As a matter of international
comity and fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United
States be asserted to cover it?67
63. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113(1895).
64. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1977); Waller.
supra note 36, at 787-88; Note, supra note 14, at 904-05.
65. It has been suggested that mutuality orreciprocity is also a necessary component of the sovereign
compulsion defense. See, e.g., Brief of the Semiconductor Industry Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 10-Il.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith RadioCorp., 106S. Ct. 1348 (1986); Statement ofShenefield
in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4 at 25; British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., 1953
Ch. 19,24 (C.A. 1952) (remarks of Evershed, M.R.). There seems to be sufficient international recogni-
tion, at least in principle, that the availability of the defense abroad need not be questioned on a case by
case basis. The European Community has stated that it will not prosecute "export agreements imposed on
firms in non-member countries by their governments." COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.
THIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 27 (1974); accord Franco-Japanese Ball-Bearings Agreement.
[1974] O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 343) 19, [1973-1975 New Dev. Transfer Binder] CoNIION MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9697 (1974) (measures imposed on Japanese acts by Japanese government were outside scope of
article 85).
Further European recognition ofsuch a defense maybe found in art. 90(2) of the Treaty of Rome (Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community), done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. I I (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1958). This article might provide an exemption from the rules of competition where
application of those rules would obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of particular tasks assigned to
the enterprises. See Meal, supra note 27, at 102 n. 196.
The United Nations also seems to have accepted the principle of a sovereign compulsion defense to
charges ofengaging in restrictive trade practices. See U. N. Rules and Principles, supra note 4, at 6, which
states "In order to ensure the fair and equitable application ofthe Set of Principles and Rules, States....
should take due account of the extent to which the conduct of enterprises .. . is required by States."
66. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
67. Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597 at 615. Answering this third question requires assessing a host of
considerations: the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the
parties, the locations of principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by
either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States
as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of
conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. Id. For an elaboration of the analysis
under this third question, see Timberlane Lumber Co., v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 749 F.2d 1378,
1384-85 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3895 (June 24, 1985) (No. 84-1761).
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Timberlane applied this balancing test to an act of state question, but
commentators have suggested that it should also be applied to the sovereign
compulsion defense. 68 At least one court has already applied this test to a
sovereign compulsion defense. 69 However, application in either context is
objectionable for two reasons. 70 First, attempting to measure and compare
the interests of countries would force courts to enter into political areas; the
act of state doctrine, however, is intended to prevent political involve-
ment. 71 Second, courts, 72 commentators, 73 and even the Justice and State
Departments 74 have questioned the ability of courts to weigh such policy
considerations. Moreover, in a sovereign compulsion context, answering
the first two Timberlane questions will be academic because the answer to
the third question will invariably be negative. 75 In light of these objections,
68. See Note, supra note 14; J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 267-68.
69. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. TACA Int'l Airlines, S.A., 748 F.2d 965, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1984)
(applied test without discussion of reasons and without citations supporting application to sovereign
compulsion defense).
70. An objection can also be made on procedural grounds, that is, policy balancing would require
extensive pretrial discovery unrelated to the merits. See Sennett & Gavil,AntitrustJurisdiction, Extrater-
ritorial Conduct and Interest-Balancing, 19 INT'L LAW. 1185, 1212(1985).
71. See FUGATE, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW 152 (3d ed. 1982). This
question has also been addressed in terms of a court's constitutional authority to hearsuch questions. See,
e.g., Sennett & Gavil, supra note 70, at 1208-11.
72. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ("Aside from
the fact that thejudiciary has little expertise, orperhaps even authority, to evaluate the economic and social
policies of a foreign country, such a balancing testis inherently unworkable. . . [where] [t]he competing
interests. . . display an irreconcilable conflict on precisely the same plane of national policy."); Laker
Airways, Ltd. v. Sabina, BeIg. World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Pursuing these
inquiries. . . does not suggest the best avenue of conflict resolution. These types of factors are not useful
in resolving the controversy."). SeealsoThomasv. WashingtonGas LightCo., 448 U.S. 261,289 (1980)
(,Vhite, J., concurring) (expressing concern that courts will "give controlling weight to [their] own
parochial interests" in balancing state interests fordefenses based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause). But
see Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1981) (approving Timberlane
approach).
73. See, e.g., Rahl, InternationalApplication ofAmerican Antitrust Laws: Issues andProposals, 2
N.W.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 336, 363-64 (1980); Task Force Report: The Antitrust Guide for International
OperationsRevisited, 1984 A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTrRuST L. 7; Sennett& Gavil, supra note 70, at 1208-11.
74. See Foreign Trade Antitrust lmprovements Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 397 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor,
Department of State, at 10; statement of Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, at 9-10).
75. Where a foreign government has directed an action within its own territory, the interest of the
United States in the extraterritorial application of United States law to conduct in that foreign country
must be weighed against the interest of that foreign country in the territorial application of its own law. No
nation has a greater or equal interest in the application of its law to conduct within, for example, Mexico
than Mexico has in the application of its own law to that conduct. There is no question that a nation has the
right and authority to regulate its exports, see C. BERGSTEN, COMPLETING THE GATT: TOWARD NEW
INTERNATIONAL RuLEs TO GovERN EXPORT CoNTRoLs 1-10 (1974), nor is there any doubt about a soy-
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the formulation of a priori rules for the application of the defense is a
preferable approach. 76
The principles of international comity also support finding a strict
territorial limit on the reach of the sovereign compulsion defense. The same
considerations that should prevent American law from interfering with the
internal decrees of foreign sovereigns should prohibit foreign sovereigns
from ordering violations of American law outside their territory. 77
Finally, international comity suggests that proper respect be given to the
statements of foreign sovereigns as to the intent, effect and purpose of their
actions. This was the consideration that first gave rise to the act of state
doctrine. 78 Experience has shown that foreign governments are not reluc-
tant to respond vigorously to what they perceive as violations of their
sovereignty. 79
5. Fairness to the Defendant
Principles of fundamental fairness suggest that de facto rather than de
jure compulsion be the standard for application of the sovereign compul-
sion defense. Fairness provides a further reason for a territorial limit to the
ereign's authority to regulate commerce within its territory. See Interamerican Refining Corp v. Texaco
Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970).
The United States has made abundant exercise of such authority. See, e.g., Mutual Defense Assistance
Control Act of 1951, § 101,22 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970) (export ofstrategic commodities to nations threaten-
ing United States security prohibited; no assistance to countries refusing to comply with embargo);
Foreign Assistance Actof 1961, § 620(a),22U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1970) (trade with Cubaprohibited; aid to
countries giving assistance to Cuban government prohibited absent presidential approval); Trading with
the Enemy Act, § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. 3 (1970) (trading with the enemy either directly or through others is
prohibited); Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401-13 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974)
extended by Exec. Order No. 11,940, 41 Fed Reg. 43,707 (1976), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. at 2149
(statute rejected prohibition on cooperation with Arab boycott of Israel in favor of encouraging non-
compliance and requiring reporting of boycott requests). See Hearings on S.948 to Amend Section 2 of
The Export ControlAct of1949 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 3
(1965).
In addition, much of American trade policy is based on the availability of a sovereign compulsion
defense in the United States. See, e.g., Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to the
Ambassador of Japan (May 7, 1981) (quoted in Matsushita & Repeta, Restricting the Supply of Japanese
Automobiles: Sovereign Compulsion orSovereign Collusion?, 14 CASEW. RES. J. INT'L L. 47, 81(1982)).
76. See Sennett & Gavil, supra note 70, at 1204-13 (1985); Waller, supra note 36, at 788. For a
discussion of appropriate a priori rules, see infra Part II.B.
77. See H. KELSEN, supra note 5, at 207-12 (principles of international law limit the extraterritorial
reach of nations); R. KLEIN, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AMONG STATES: THE HISTORY OFAN IDEA 57-59 (1974)
(principle of sovereign equality limits the extraterritorial reach of nations). But see id. at 167-68;
Schwarzenberger, The Forms of Sovereignty, in IN DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY 160,190 (W. Stankiewicz,
ed. 1969) (sovereign equality does not really exist in superpower relations). However, it would be
disingenuous to subscribe formally to the principle of sovereign equality, as the United States has done in
signing the U.N. Charter(seeU.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1), while insisting on the authorityto apply one's
own law within the territory of a foreign sovereign in opposition to the law of that sovereign.
78. See supra note 53.
79. See supra note 6.
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reach of sovereign compulsion. Fairness requires that private parties not be
subjected to conflicting demands in different jurisdictions. It is inequitable
to punish a party in this country for conduct in another country that was
compelled by the laws of that country. 80 Without the protection of a
sovereign compulsion defense, enterprises would frequently be faced with
the choice of either violating the laws of one or another country or ceasing
to do business with one of the countries. 81 Moreover, culpability in such a
situation lies with the foreign government; therefore punishing the private
party through treble damage actions is not an appropriate means of seeking
redress. 82
The desire not to subject defendants to court orders that require violation
of foreign law has led to the inclusion of "saving clauses" in many of the
judgments involving jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct. 83 The effect
of a saving clause may well be that the conduct, against which sanctions
were intended to be applied, escapes the application of sanctions al-
together. 84 Because a protective mechanism is available for conduct taken
80. See J. ATWOOD & J. BREwsTER, supra note 6, at 265; Meal, supra note 27.
81. Ironically, enforcement of sanctions for anticompetitive behavior could have an anticompetitive
effect. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 60, at3723 (consent decree limited in orderto
protect conduct of business in Arab League countries).
82. See Sennett & Gavil, supra note 70, at 1213-14.
Other avenues for redress include bilateral negotiations and agreements, (see, e.g., Memorandum of
Understanding between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America
as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation With Respect to the Application of National Antitrust
Laws, Mar. 9,1984, - U.S.T.- , T.I.A.S. No. -, reprintedin 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
1 50,440; Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation, United States-Australia, June 29, 1982, - U.S.T.
- , T.I.A.S. No. 10365, reprinted in [1983 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,440;
Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, United States-
Federal Republic of Germany, June 23, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291, reprinted in [1983
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,238), and other dispute resolution procedures authorized
underinternational agreements. See generally Sandler, Primeron United States TradeRemedies, 191r'L
LAW. 761 (1985).
83. A saving clause is a provision in ajudgment that excuses a party from compliance with the terms
and conditions of the judgment where compliance would involve a violation of the laws of another
country. See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(order exempted actions required or forbidden under Swiss law.); United States v. United Fruit Co.,
1978-1Trade Cas. (CCH) T 62,001 § VII (E.D. La. 1978) (defendant notincontempt ofjudgment where
action taken abroad is required by foreign country); Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 60, at
3723 (effect of consent judgment limited to United States to prevent loss of trade with Middle Eastern
countries).
84. See, e.g., British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 1955 Ch. 37,53 (1954)
(portion ofjudgment of United States court exempting conduct that would violate foreign law asserted as
grounds for denying enforcement of that judgment). Because United States courts have recognized
territoriality as a basis for limiting the application of antitrust judgments, it seems unwise to do so in a
manner that provides an opportunity foroffending the foreign sovereign before limiting the judgment. By
making it clear from the outset that conduct required by a foreign government will not be subjected to
sanction, this potential political embarrassment can be avoided.
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within a foreign country pursuant to the direction of the government of that
foreign country, it is unfair to require that defendants engage in extensive
discovery and a full trial before obtaining saving clause protection. The
same result can be achieved more economically through an affirmative
defense based on sovereign compulsion. 85 In addition, because there can be
no reasonable expectation that conduct taken within the territory of the
United States will be protected, territoriality is also a component of
fairness.
Finally, national governments can compel actions by means other than
the enactment of or prosecution under law. The threat of prosecution or
other sanctions alone can be compulsive. 86 Therefore, although the ques-
tioned conduct must truly be compelled by the foreign government, fair-
ness dictates that the compulsion test be practical rather than formalistic;
that is, the test should be de facto rather than de jure compulsion.
B. Conduct Protected by the Defense
The policy rationales behind the sovereign compulsion defense can be
used to delineate the elements of the defense. First, the compelled conduct
must occur within the territory of the compelling sovereign. This follows
from all five of the policies supporting the defense. 87 Conduct within the
territory of the compelling sovereign should include obedience to controls
on imports, 88 domestic commerce, and exports.8 9 Under no circumstances
85. Where a legitimate claim of sovereign compulsion is made, the focus of discovery will initially be
on the facts surrounding the compulsion. If compulsion is successfully demonstrated, further laborious
discovery will not be necessary.
86. See, e.g., Eastern AirLines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d957,980(5thCir. 1976)
("jawboning" and threats of official action by United States government officials constituted sufficient
compulsion to excuse liability for damages for delayed delivery to other customers).
87. See supra notes 35-39, 50-56, 76, 80 and accompanying text.
88. Such controls should include restrictions on source or destination, quantity, quality or custom-
ers. International agreements impose limitations on the extent to which these measures may be employed.
See generally Sandier, supra note 82.
Compliance with import and export controls should be interpreted to include participation in "pri-
mary" but not "secondary" boycotts, which are in fact conduct within the United States. An example of a
"primary boycott" is the refusal of the Arab League countries to do business with firms that also trade with
Israel. A catalogue of"black listed" firms was produced and imports of items purchased from these firms
was prohibited. The "secondary boycott" is the refusal by American merchants to deal with those "black
listed" firms in matters unrelated to export to the boycotting countries for fear of losing future business
opportunities. See Baker, Antitrust Remedies Against Government-Inspired Boycotts, Shortages, and
Squeezes: Wandering on the Road to Mecca, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 911, 938-42 (1976). See generally
Timberg, supra note 1I. A variation of the secondary boycott would be a requirement that United States
manufacturers not purchase from certain suppliers within the United States. This would not be protected
because it purports to direct the conduct of business within the United States and would be a violation of
United States sovereignty. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement. supra note 60, at 3723.
89. A special problem is presented by controls on international shipping. Unlike other aspects of
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would any restraint on further sales or transfers of goods by an exporter,
subsidiary or branch office in the United States be protected.
Second, there must have been de facto compulsion in order for a
defendant to use sovereign compulsion. This is necessary out of fairness to
defendants90 and also follows from an analogy to state action immunity.91
In many situations, the threat of severe sanctions by a foreign government
may not be required in order to achieve compliance from commercial
enterprises. 92 In such a situation, the requirement of such sanctions can
only be seen as an irrational attempt to mold other countries' regulatory
action after our own. 93 Moreover, a requirement that foreign government
compulsion take the form of legislative enactments would hamper Ameri-
can foreign policy. The United States has, in general, espoused a procom-
petitive policy toward international trade. 94 Requiring formal legislative
action may severely impede the repeal of trade restrictions, thus making it
more difficult for America to achieve its goal of competitive markets.
Requiring formal legislation could be especially vexing where trade re-
straints are imposed temporarily, perhaps in response to currency fluctua-
tions, temporary shortages, or even in response to a request by the United
States government. There is a risk that legislative inertia may prevent their
repeal after conditions have normalized.
A third element of this criterion is that the challenged conduct must not
have exceeded what was compelled. For example, if a foreign government
decrees that its domestic producers may not sell to more than five exporters
who intend to export to the United States, 95 neither the producers nor the
exporters may use that decree in defense of further restrictions on custom-
ers or territories within the United States. Neither would the defense
protect an agreement by all foreign producers to sell to fewer than five or to
a single exporter, nor would it protect an agreement by producers to each
sell to the same five exporters to the exclusion of others.96 In dealing with
international commerce, shipping is both one nation's export and anothernation's import simultaneously.
Several countries have resolved this by exempting shipping from their competition laws. Comment, The
Shipping Act of 1984: Bringing the United States in Harmony with International Shipping Practices, 3
DICK. J. INT'L L. 197, 201 & n.26 (1985).
90. See supra Part II.A.5.
91. See supra Part II.A.1.
92. See supra note 86.
93. SeeJL ATWOOD& K. BREwsTER, supra note 6, at281 ("RespectgivenbyAmerican courts should
not depend on how foreign procedures stack up under United States constitutional system.").
94. Seeking voluntary restraint agreements is a notable exception to this policy. See Matsushita &
Repeta, supra note 75, at 50-51.
95. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
96. The practical effect of the sovereign compulsion defense in this latter situation would be to
exclude all reference to the government decree as evidence of conspiracy but to allow as evidence the
agreement as to which five exporters would get all that nation's business. Reference to the exclusion of all
but five exporters would be admissible as evidence of actions in restraint of trade.
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United States commerce, private parties must compete to the extent they
are not otherwise compelled by the government.
C. Use of Statements by Foreign Governments as Proof of Compulsion
When analyzing the treatment by American courts of foreign govern-
ment statements, it is important to distinguish between those statements
regarding foreign law or a foreign sovereign's intent, and those that merely
suggest the belief of a sovereign as to facts or an interpretation of interna-
tional law. The latter situation has arisen most commonly in admiralty,
where a foreign sovereign has asserted that a libelled ship was in govern-
ment service and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity.97 These "sug-
gestions" are properly treated as the sovereign's position on the contested
facts, and deserve no more weight than the statements of any other party to
litigation. 98
On the other hand, in contexts other than sovereign compulsion, state-
ments by foreign sovereigns regarding the effect and intent of their domes-
tic law and their official intentions and policies, have been given deference
by United States courts. 99
Despite this precedent, in two recent cases, In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation, 100 and In re Japanese Consumer Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation ("Zenith"), 101 participation by foreign governments on behalf of
97. See. e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945): Exparte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943).
98. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. RepublicofCuba, 425 U.S. 682,694-95 (1976). ButseeThe Carlo Poma,
259 F. 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1919) ("suggestion" by the Italian ambassador accepted as "verity"); The
Clavaresk, 264 F. 276, 279-80 (2d Cir. 1920) (certification by an ambassador stated to be a "verity"
although in light of other evidence presented, reliance on such certification was unnecessary).
99. This position has been takenbytheSupremeCourt in United States v. Pink. 315 U.S. 203,218-21
(1942) (Soviet Commissariat for Justice statement that nationalization decrees were intended to have
extraterritorial effect deemed "conclusive.") and by the Second Circuit in Agency of Canadian Car &
Foundry Co. v. American Can Co., 258 F. 363,368-69 (2d Cir. 1919) ("an authoritative representation by
the Russian government" through its ambassador was held "binding and conclusive in the courts of the
United States. ... )  See also The Carlo Poma, 259 F. 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1919); The Clavaresk 264 F.
276,279-80 (2d Cir. 1920); D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (D. Del. 1976),
aff'd per curian, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978) (opinion of Mexican
Attorney General "precludes this court from reexamining the question"); United States v. Melekh, 190 F.
Supp. 67, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (letter of Soviet ambassador held to be "conclusive"). In each of these
cases, a statement by a foreign government regarding the intent or effect of its actions was given
conclusive effect.
100. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). In this case, the submission by foreign governments of amici
curiae briefs contestingjurisdiction was labelled "shocking" and "subservient" to the interests of foreign
businesses. Id. at 1256. Perhaps the Uranium court's hostility can be excused in view of the fact that the
named defendants had refused to present themselves to contest jurisdiction. This "recalcitrant attitude"
and contumacity, id. at 1255 & n.30, may have provoked this inflammatory and unnecessary outburst.
101. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
rev'd in part sub non. In reJapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd. 106
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defendants has been received unfavorably by United States courts. 102
However, because of the potentially adverse consequences of ignoring or
disputing foreign governments in areas of their domestic policies, 103 this
treatment should be extended to the statements of foreign sovereigns
presented in antitrust litigation.
1. Function of Statements as Evidence of Compulsion
Companies compelled by foreign government policies to act in violation
of United States antitrust laws risk sanctions by United States courts. This
risk may encourage private parties to obtain objective evidence of the
policies in question, possibly including a statement of the government,
before engaging in anticompetitive activities that affect United States
commerce. In light of the historical treatment of government statements, an
ambassadorial certificate or properly authenticated statement of an officer
or agency with regulatory authority should be conclusive evidence of
foreign government policy, law, and intent. 104 Of course, where the com-
pulsion is based on a statute or other ordinance, the existence of the statute
itself should be sufficient evidence of compulsion, and further explanation
by the government would be superfluous. 105
Where a complaint alleges abuse of delegated authority, the require-
ments of a sovereign compulsion defense should be satisfied by a statement
from the delegating authority that the conduct was in keeping with its
policies. 106 If a defense of sovereign compulsion depends on precatory
compulsion, a statement by the government of its intention that its sugges-
tions have compulsive effect and of its willingness to take stronger mea-
sures in the event of a lack of compliance, should be sufficient to establish
that the compulsion was not merely the subjective belief of the defendant.
Of course, a statement by a foreign government official is not the only
method of proving actual compulsion, and there may be other objective
S. Ct. 1348 (1986). In this case, the court stated that it would be possible to find facts directly contradictory
to those asserted by the Government of Japan. See Brief for the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae at
5, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). However, the response
in the district court is particularly surprising given the historical treatment of this type of statement.
102. See also United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,600, 77,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (protest by Swiss government ignored although scope of
judgment modified).
103. See supra note 6.
104. But see Matsushita & Repeta, supra note 75, at 59-61 (arguing that statements by foreign
sovereigns should be given no weight at all).
105. See, e.g., Watchmakers of Switz., 1963TradeCas. (CCH)at77,456(compulsionunderforeign
law would provide a defense).
106. See, e.g., ContinentalOreCo. v. UnionCarbide&CarbonCorp., 370U.S. 690,706-07 (1962)
(no defense where there was no evidence that foreign government officials approved of manner in which
delegated authority was exercised).
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manifestations of policy sufficient to prove that the exercise of delegated
authority to restrict trade10 7 was carried out in accordance with the clearly
articulated policy of the delegating government. It is, however, difficult to
imagine what evidence might be produced that would qualify mere pre-
catory compulsion for the defense without such a statement. 108
2. Form of Submission
The interests of fairness and justice require that statements submitted by
foreign governments meet certain minimum requirements. Although
courts should give proper consideration to the statements made by foreign
governments in the form of amici curiae briefs, it is suggested that a formal
government statement, properly certified and submitted to the court in
accordance with the procedures suggested by the Department of State,
would be a more effective means of establishing the statement as evi-
dence. 109
First, the statement should specify the legal authority of the organ or
agency that promulgated the order, and the means of enforcement or
penalties for noncompliance; that is, the extent of government supervision
over the activities of the defendant must be stated. 110 Second, the statement
should give a clear articulation of the policies under which the conduct was
directed. This would be of particular importance where the claim of
sovereign compulsion is based on precatory compulsion. Finally, any such
statement should give a description of the conduct compelled, sufficiently
specific to allow a United States court to determine the extent of defendant's
compliance. However, the statement need not be so detailed that the
preparation of the statement becomes onerous. 11
107. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690.706 (1962) (Anti-
trust liability was upheld where authority delegated to purchase and allocate vanadium for all Canadian
industries and that delegated authority used to exclude certain parties from Canadian market and there
was no indication that Canadian authorities "approved or would have approved. "). See also J. ATwooD &
K. BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 262-64.
108. The fact that a course of conduct was recommended or suggested does not imply the existence of
a "clearly articulated public policy." Therefore, where such a suggestion or recommendation is the only
evidence of compulsion, a statement by the government of its policy, whethergiven publicly ordirectly to
a court, would be the only method of proving compulsion.
109. Courts are not required to give any weight to or even consider briefs of amici. However, once a
government statement has been introduced and made part of the record of the trial, it must be dealt with as
such.
110. Verifying the authority of the issuing body will assure the court that the compulsion in question
was in fact "sovereign," as well as establish "in fact" compulsion.
11I. For example, in a minimum export price fixing case, it should suffice that the sovereign make a
statement to the effect that it compelled setting a minimum price and that the price actually established
was in accordance with the direction. However, in a customer allocation (boycott) case, the statement
should state specifically the limitations that were placed on customer/supplier selection, and in no case
should effect be given to secondary allocation or boycott orders. See supra Part II.A.4.
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In view of these requirements, the statement submitted by MITI in the
Zenith case 1 2 provides an example where this third requirement was not
met. Item three of that document states that MITI directed an agreement on
minimum prices "and other matters concerning domestic transactions
relating to exports .... ",113 This failure to specify what other actions
were directed might imply that the MITI statement was intended to protect
any and all activities of the defendants that might be subject to sanction
under United States law. Although it would be understandable if such were
MITI's intent, a United States court could not in good conscience take
cognizance of such a broad statement, not only out of consideration for the
plaintiff's litigation, but in consideration that other means of redress may
depend on an express statement of the foreign government's activities and
policies. 114
III. CONCLUSION
The defense of sovereign compulsion in antitrust actions is founded on
criteria like those governing state action immunity in domestic law, with
special provisions to insure strict territorial limitations in accordance with
international comity. Conduct that is in fact compelled by another govern-
ment deserves immunity from antitrust liability in this country, whether
that compulsion takes the form of legislation or fiat.
The clearest evidence of foreign government compulsion is a statute.
However, statements submitted by foreign governments merit conclusive
weight in establishing the existence of government policies or intentions
sufficient to support a sovereign compulsion defense, and in establishing
the extent of that government's directives. Therefore, where a foreign
sovereign has submitted a statement of sufficient clarity which demon-
strates the requisite degree of compulsion, commensurate with the ana-
lytical bases for the sovereign compulsion defense, failure to recognize the
defense disfavors not only the interests of justice but the international
interests of the United States as well.
Steven J. Hawes
112. MITI Statement, supra note 21.
113. Id. at 3.
114. For example, efforts to achieve redress through bilateral negotiations might be hampered by a
foreign government's insistence that an interpretation given to a broad statement by a United States court
was mistaken.
